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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Testimony of Bibulous Accomplice to "Pig
Larceny" Insufficient to Sustain Conviction
Where Material Corroboration is Lacking.Three gay comrades entered upon a tour of
the local pubs, living almost entirely upon
liquid sustenance for a three day period. Sometime during the second day the three replenished their dwindling assets by appropriating a
number of shoats from an unguarded farm in the
area and selling them to a local stock dealer. An
unfortunate error on the part of the miscreants
proved their undoing. It appears that one of the
swine which they had seized had the distinctive
marking of red ears and was recognized by his
owner at an auction sale held by the stock
dealer. In the meanwhile, one of the conspirators was nursing a well-deserved hangover in
the local lock-up and "this new association and
law-abiding influence resulted in full repentance
for his sins and a conscience-relieving confession" was signed and delivered to the sheriff.
Two of the defendants pleaded guilty at the
arraignment, one being sentenced and the
other applying for probation. It was this latter
who turned state's evidence at the defendant's
trial for hog larceny, the subsequent conviction
being based almost entirely on the evidence
which the turncoat gave at the trial. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the conviction, holding that "[blecause the testimony
of the accomplice Davis lacks material corroboration, is denied by the defendant and another
accomplice whose testimony is not such as to be
unworthy of belief, and because of the prejudicial statements about other offenses, we are
not satisfied that defendant's guilt has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt." People
v. Hermens, 125 N.E.2d 500 (1955)
Although this holding on its face does not
appear to be of earth-shaking consequence,
other portions of the court's opinion may be of
material aid to prosecutors. During the course
of the trial photographs of the reunited crea-

tures were introduced to establish their ownership and origin. "And when the first owner saw
that little shoat with the red ears, and when he
spoke to them and they came running to him,
he knew his lost prodigals had been found. Upon
their return home they were photographed, in
six different poses, both with and without a
group of their brothers and sisters. While these
photographs are not in color, to show the identifying red ears, they are not without color dramatically. In addition to the aesthetic and artistic value which they add to the record, their
evidentiary value, cursorily inconsequential, is
subtly inferential. A lingering concentration,
such as true art deserves, reveals that these
pigs appear just as well fed and contented as
their stay-at-home kin; nor is there anything in
their forms, figures or faces indicating that they
possess more daring or adventurous spirits. Consequently, any possible inference that they voluntarily ran away from home, eithier because of
mistreatment or a spirit of wanderlust, is e ffetively dispelled" (emphasis supplied). The court
further noted that another area of confusion had
been laid to rest by a state expert who stated
"that 'swine,' 'hogs,' 'pigs,' and 'shoats' were
all appropriate designations for these little
creatures, thus legally establishing, at long last,
the oft-heard profundity that 'pigs is pigs.'"
Other portions of the opinion will likewise repay
many-fold a close and careful study.
Judge Does Not Possess Unfettered Discretion to Exclude Public and Press From CourtRoom Where Defendant Has Waived Privilege
for Public Trial-In a prosecution for pandering the defendant requested that the trial judge
exclude the public, including the press, from the
court-room during the cross-examination of the
prosecuting witness. The ground for the request
was that counsel for defendant would "be
'better able to compel the witness to tell the
truth' " if she could be cross-examined in pri-
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vate. The trial judge entered an order granting
the request and the order was enforced. An
Ohio Appellate court issued a writ of prohibition to the trial judge precluding him from
issuing such orders in future cases, absent certain enumerated discretionary exceptions. E.
W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955).
The court distinguished between the defendants constitutional right to insist on a public
trial and the supposed right of a defendant to
insist on a private trial. In the latter instance
the right of the public is paramount and the
open court-room is a necessary and integral
part of the administration of criminal justice. A
trial judge may, at his discretion, exclude persons from a court room when their conduct disturbs the proceedings, if their presence is likely
to interfere with substantial justice to the parties involved in the proceedings, or where such
exclusion is necessary to the public health,
safety or morals. Beyond this point a trial
judge has no discretion to award a defendant in
a criminal proceeding a private trial. The fact
that the petitioner in this proceeding happened
to be a representative of the press did not
change the basic issue, which was the right of
the public to demand an open hearing. For the
purposes of this proceeding the petitioner stood
as a representative of the public.
Unauthorized Presence of Defendant in
School Building Constitutes Disorderly Conduct-Defendant was apprehended by a school
teacher for loitering in the halls of a school
building. His explanation justifying his presence
on the premises was ambiguous and he was
prosecuted for disorderly conduct under the
applicable New York statute, which states in
part: "Any person not the parent or legal guardian of a pupil in regular attendance at said
school who loiters in or about any public school
building or grounds.., shall be guilty of disorderly conduct." N.Y. PENAL LAW §722-h
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the statute was too vague, and
even if not vague, that his actions did not constitute a violation thereof. The trial court
denied the motion and found the defendant
guilty of disorderly conduct. People v. Parker,

138 N.Y.S.2d 2 (City Mag. Ct., Youth Term
Ct. 1955). The court first found that the statute
was not so vague that it could not be enforced.
In arriving at this conclusion the court examined similar statutes in California and Arizona
which have been held to be valid. Turning to
the defendant's contention that his actions did
not constitute a breach of the peace, the court
observed that the term "is quite broad and includes not only all violations of the public
peace and order but acts tending to the disturbance thereof." The defendant's unauthorized and inadequately explained presence was
found sufficient to establish a violation of the
statute. The result in the instant case was justified on policy grounds, the court stating that
it is common knowledge that "school children
are the prey and victims of vicious dealers in
narcotics and lewd literature, and subject to
molestation by sex degenerates.... Teachers
have been annoyed and attacked, public property destroyed or other breach of the peace may
be occasioned by trespassers."
The result reached in this case points to a
possible solution to what seems to be a growing
problem in affording adequate protection to
public property and to children and teachers
from abuse by unscrupulous individuals.
Arrest by State Officer Pursuant to Information Supplied by Federal Agent Insufficient to
Establish Degree of Cooperation Requirerd to
Render Illegally Seized Evidence Inadmissible
-A Federal Narcotics Agent informed a state
police official that the defendant was believed to
be transporting narcotics from Mexico into the
United States. Solely on the basis of this information the officer arrested the defendant,
placed him in custody of another state official
and then searched his car where packages of
marihuana were found. Although the federal
agent and the state official were not "working
together" it was shown that they "kept constantly in touch". Defendant appealed from his
conviction for unlawfully obtaining marihuana
without paying the special transfer tax thereon,
assigning as error, inter alia, that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the
evidence obtained by the state officer without a
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search warrant. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that although the search was
illegal the evidence was nonetheless admissible
since the defendant had failed to establish that
the Federal Narcotics Agent had used this
means to obtain the evidence illegally. Shurman
v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955)
(reversed on other grounds). After finding that
the search was illegal because the state officer
had failed to obtain a search warrant under
circumstances which showed ample opportunity to do so, the court found that the illegal
search did not render the evidence so obtained
inadmissible. Noting that evidence illegally obtained by a state officer will not provide a basis
to suppress the evidence in a subsequent federal
prosecution, the court stated that "without
some showing of a tacit or expressed understanding, difficult though it may be to find
proof thereof, we would be unwilling to hold
that giving of information which results in an
illegal search, constitutes an attempt to procure
evidence illegally.... We cannot denounce such
exchange of information between law enforcement agencies where no attempt is otherwise
shown to do indirectly what is prohibited to do
directly."
Preliminary Motion to Suppress Illegally
Seized Evidence Not Required Under NewlyFormulated California Exclusionary Rule-A
considerable amount of documentary evidence
was seized under a general warrant authorizing
unlimited search and seizure. Pursuant to a
hearing on a writ of mandamus the Superior
Court quashed the warrant and directed that
the illegally seized evidence be returned to the
defendant. During the course of the proceedings, however, the District Attorney had
made photostats of the papers. A second writ of
mandamus for delivery of the photos was
prayed for by defendant, but the writ was
denied, although no formal judgment was
entered in this second proceeding. The photostats were admitted at the trial over the objection that they had been illegally obtained and
the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
commit grand and petty theft and conspiracy
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to solicit for charitable purposes without a
permit. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
California the conviction was reversed. People
v. Berger, 282 P.2d 509 (1955).
"Since the photostats are as much a product
of the illegal search and seizure and are as
tainted by it as the original papers themselves,
... the deception practiced by the prosecution
in this case cannot circumvent the rule adopted
in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Calif. 1955)."
Rejecting the argument that the objection by
the defendant was not seasonably presented,
the court stated that since preliminary questions of fact governing admissibility are determined at the time of objection that "there are
no compelling reasons why an exception to the
general rule should be made in the case of illegally obtained evidence."
A dissenting group of three judges would
affirm the conviction since the guilt of the defendant was clearly established. The dissent
points out that the majority decision rests
entirely upon the Cahan case in which it also
dissented.
The instant case was decided on the same day
as the Cahan case, (abstracted in the Police
Science Legal Abstracts and Notes section of
this issue), and serves notice on California
prosecutors and law enforcement officers that
the Supreme Court of California does not intend
to be restricted by any of the qualifications
imposed upon the federal exclusionary rule. In
denying the prosecution any opportunity to
make indirect or derivative use of illegally
seized evidence the court does follow established
doctrines. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1921); Gouled v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1920); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). However, in rejecting the argument that a defendant who is
aware of an illegal seizure must move to suppress the evidence prior to the trial, the court is
espousing a minority view enunciated in United
States v. Asendio, 171 F.2d 122 (3rd Cir. 1948)
and which has not been widely accepted by the
federal courts. See, Comment, The Federal
Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 45 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 51, at 60 (1954).

